University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 27
Number 2 Spring 1997

Article 8

1997

Recent Developments: Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis:
Proper Federal Court Jurisdiction at Time of
Judgment Cures an Earlier Erroneous Denial of
Motion to Remand an Improperly Removed Case
Donna L. Lyons

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Lyons, Donna L. (1997) "Recent Developments: Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis: Proper Federal Court Jurisdiction at Time of Judgment
Cures an Earlier Erroneous Denial of Motion to Remand an Improperly Removed Case," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 27 :
No. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol27/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Recent Developments
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis

I

n a unanimous decision, the
United States Supreme
Court held in Caterpillar, Inc. v.
Lewis, 117 S. Ct. 467 (1996), that
a district court's error in failing to
remand an improperly removed
case was not fatal to the
adjudication when jurisdiction was
proper at the time of judgment.
The Court so held despite its
finding that the plaintiff did not
waive his objection to removal by
failing to seek an immediate
appeal of the district court's denial
of his motion to remand. In
reversing the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
the Court extended its prior
holdings to instances where the
plaintiff has moved timely, yet
unsuccessfully, to remand a case
for improper removal.
On June 22, 1989, James
David Lewis ("Lewis") filed a
products liability suit in a
Kentucky state court after sustaining injuries while operating a
bulldozer at work. Lewis, a citizen
of Kentucky, asserted state law
claims against both the bulldozer's
manufacturer, Caterpillar, Inc.
("Caterpillar"), a Delaware corporation, and Whayne Supply
Company
("Whayne"),
the
Kentucky corporation that serviced
the bulldozer. Liberty Mutual
("Liberty
Insurance
Group
Mutual"), a Massachusetts corporation and Lewis' employer's
insurance carrier, intervened as
plaintiff by asserting subrogation
claims against Caterpillar and
Whayne for workers' compensa-
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tion paid to Lewis by his employer.
Within a year of initiating the
suit, Lewis settled his claims with
Whayne. On June 21, 1990,
Caterpillar filed a notice of
removal in the United States
District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky, claiming that
complete diversity among the
parties had been reached as a result
of Lewis , settlement with Whayne.
After the removal was granted,
Lewis objected to the removal and
moved to remand the case back to
state court, urging that Liberty
Mutual's remaining action against
Whayne prevented completed
diversity jurisdiction. His motion,
however, was rejected by the
district court, which erroneously
held that diversity was complete.
In 1993, prior to trial, Liberty
Mutual and Whayne reached a
settlement.
Whayne was dismissed as a party to the suit,
thereby completing diversity between the parties prior to the
district court's subsequent judgment for Caterpillar. Following

the district court's denial of Lewis'
motion for a new trial, Lewis
appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit. Finding that
complete diversity did not exist at
the time of removal, the court of
appeals vacated the district court's
judgment and Caterpillar appealed
to the United States Supreme
Court.
In beginning its analysis, the
Court first stated two "givens": (1)
the district court had erred in
denying Lewis' motion to remand;
and (2) the court of appeals was
correct in concluding that complete diversity did not exist at the
time of removal. Caterpillar Inc.
v. Lewis, 117 S. Ct. at 473.
The Court then analyzed
Caterpillar's assertion that vacation of judgment would be improper in light of the Supreme
Court's decisions in American Fire
& Gas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6
(1951), and Grubbs v. General
Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S.
699 (1972). Caterpillar at 473-74.
In Finn, the Court held that
vacation of judgment is proper
when federal jurisdiction is lacking
at the time judgment is entered.
Caterpillar at 473-74 (citing Finn,
341 U.S. at 17-18). The Court
subsequently limited the ability of
plaintiffs to appeal removals in
Grubbs when it held "the validity
of the removal procedure followed,
may not be raised for the first time
on appeal." Caterpillar at 474-75
(quoting Grubbs, 405 U.S. at 700).
In response to Caterpillar's arguments, the Court countered that
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their prior decisions in Finn and
Grubbs did not resolve the issue in
Caterpillar, namely, whether a
plaintiff may appeal a judgment
when the district court has erroneously denied a removal. Id. at
474.
Furthermore, the Court found
that Lewis had preserved his
objection to removal since the
denial of a motion to remand is not
final and is therefore not immediately appealable as of right.
Id. at 475. Thus, Lewis' failure to
pursue an interlocutory appeal did
not waive his right to appeal. Id.
The Court reasoned that if failure
to pursue interlocutory appeals
waived diversity jurisdiction
objections, the purpose of providing interlocutory review for
"exceptional" cases would be
destroyed by routine requests for
review. Id.
The Court next considered
Lewis' argument that, having
timely preserved his objection,
"[the] ultimate satisfaction of the
subject-matter
jurisdiction
requirement ought not swallow up
antecedent statutory violations,"
because such a course would
prejudice plaintiffs who timely,
but unsuccessfully, mo've to remand. Id. at 475-76. In addition,
Lewis
claimed
Caterpillar
circumvented the procedural
limitations of28 U.S.C. § 1446(b),
because they avoided the one-year
limitation to file for removal by
removing before subject-matter
jurisdiction existed. Id. at 476.
The Supreme Court, however,
wholly rejected Lewis' arguments
in favor of policy considerations of
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"finality, efficiency, and economy.
... " Id. The Court relied, in part,
on its decision in Newman-Green,
Inc. v. AlJonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S.
826 (1989), in which it posited
that, "requiring dismissal after
years of litigation would impose
unnecessary and wasteful burdens.
... " Caterpillar at 476 (quoting
Newman-Green at 836).
The
Court maintained that economical
adjudication outweighed the need
to vacate an improperly removed
case in which subject-matter
jurisdiction was ultimately satisfied. Id. The Court emphasized,
however, that judgments may still
be vacated in cases lacking
subject-matter jurisdiction at the
time of judgment. Id. at 477.
In addition, the Court also
disagreed with Lewis' remaining
arguments, stating that it did not
believe its ruling would encourage
wrongful or premature removals
by defendants desiring to either
bypass the one-year removal
requirement or gamble on future
events to create proper subjectmatter jurisdiction. Id. at 477.
The Court reasoned that it was
unlikely that defendants would
take a chance on the jurisdictional
defect escaping detection and
subsequently being cured prior to
judgment. !d. Such an attempt
would result in a quick remand and
raise the ire of the court. Id.
The United States Supreme
Court in Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis
held that despite an erroneous
refusal to remand, the resolution of
a jurisdictional subject-matter
defect before judgment will
prevent a vacated judgment upon

appeal. Caterpillar is an example
of the Court's unanimous promotion of judicial economy over
procedural rights. Unfortunately,
under Caterpillar, plaintiffs denied
their requests for remand will have
to immediately appeal the decision
in order to preserve their forum
choice. Thus, the interlocutory
appeal the Court said should be
used for "exceptional" cases, will
have to be utilized for plaintiffs
who want to preserve their forum
choice in light of a refusal to
remand. Whether the Court has
drawn a line in the sand, protecting
the vestiges of subject-matter
jurisdiction by asserting that
complete diversity must exist at
judgment remains to be seen.
Based on the trend of judicial
economy, one is unsure when the
newly established line will move
yet again.

